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The Trafficking Victim
Protection Act: The Best Hope
for International Human Rights
Litigation in the U.S. Courts?
Sara Sun Beale
Since the 1980s, the Alien Tort Statute1 (ATS) has been the main
vehicle used to bring human rights claims against corporations and
individuals in the U.S. courts. Several recent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court have radically restricted the scope of the ATS.
After a brief description of the rise of human rights litigation
under the ATS and the cases that have restricted its use, this essay
explores whether the Trafficking Victim Protection Act (TVPA) can
take the place of the ATS as a vehicle for litigating claims of human
rights abuses in civil cases or criminal prosecutions in the U.S. federal
courts. It concludes that for a narrow but important class of human
rights violations— those involving forced labor, sex and forced labor
trafficking, and knowingly benefitting from any of these offenses—the
TVPA offers a firm footing for both civil and criminal cases.
These offenses are the subject of considerable interest at the
present time. The UN’s Ruggie Principles2 require states to “protect


Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor, Duke Law School. The author would
like to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Logan Page,
Duke Law ‘19. Some portions of this analysis are drawn from Sara Sun
Beale, United States Country Report for “Prosecuting Corporations for
Violations of International Criminal Law: Jurisdictional Issues,” Section
4 of the XXTH Association International De Droit/International
Association of Penal Law Congress, 88 INT’L REV. CRIM. L., issue 2
(forthcoming 2018), http://www.penal.org/en/list-national-groups. The
author participated in the group of advisers that developed the draft
resolutions discussed in the text accompanying note 5.

1.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). For the original version of the ATS, see
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73.

2.

In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed UN Special
Representative John Ruggie’s “Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and
Remedy’ Framework.” They read:
“These Guiding Principles are grounded in recognition of:
(a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human
rights and fundamental freedoms;
(b) The role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society
performing specialized functions, required to comply with all applicable
laws and to respect human rights;
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against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction
by third parties, including business enterprises” by “taking
appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such
abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and
adjudication.”3 Both national and international groups are focusing
on the need to hold corporations responsible.4 At the Association
Internationale De Droit Pénal’s next International Congress, delegates
from dozens of countries will consider draft resolutions urging states
to revise and develop their legal frameworks to enable the

investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses that occur
in a company’s core business activity, in its supply or
distribution chain, and in its other business arrangements that
involve multiple legal entities.5 Additionally, a broad coalition of
85 Swiss organizations is seeking to develop a framework to protect
human rights and the environment abroad by setting common
benchmarks for all companies based in Switzerland.6

(c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate
and effective remedies when breached.
These Guiding Principles apply to all States and to all business
enterprises, both transnational and others, regardless of their size,
sector, location, ownership and structure.”
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf, (last visited June 3, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/ULP7-DR8D].
3.

Id.

4.

See DAVID VOGEL, THE REVIVAL OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
in THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY at 11, (2005) (“…national and
international business organizations active in promoting [Corporate
Social Responsibility] include the International Business Leaders Forum,
the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, the Conference Board,
Business in the Community, and San Francisco–based Business for
Social Responsibility.”).

5.

See XXth AIDP International Congress of Penal Law, Prosecuting
Companies for Violations of International Human Rights: Jurisdictional
Issues, DRAFT RESOLUTIONS, (June 2-4, 2017), last visited Mar. 31,
2018)
http://www.penal.org/sites/default/files/files/XX_AIDP_
DRAFT_RESOLUTIONS_circulate.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/6E52VAT8]. The Association holds national groups in more than 30
countries.
See
also
AIDP,
List
of
National
Groups,
http://www.penal.org/en/list-national-groups (last visited Feb. 1, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/SC87-89C9].

6.

SWISS COALITION FOR CORPORATE JUSTICE,
initiative.ch/?lang=en
(last
visited
Jan.
[https://perma.cc/P3M9-F48S].
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Although the TVPA can make a contribution to efforts to hold
corporations responsible for human rights violations, unfortunately
many of its key statutory terms are unclear and, in some cases, poorly
drafted. The flaws appeared as Congress repeatedly returned to the
topic of trafficking in connection with reauthorizing funding for
related programs, adding substantive provisions that seem to have
received little scrutiny.7 The courts have interpreted few of these
terms, and it is difficult to say how much they will hamper
enforcement.
This essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses the rise in
ATS litigation and the Supreme Court’s decisions restricting its
application, which provide an incentive to search for alternatives and
may also reflect judicial attitudes that could affect the interpretation
of the TVPA. Part II discusses the enactment and amendment of the
TVPA, and provides an overview of the key offenses as well as the
civil and criminal remedies. Part III explores issues raised by
Congress’s failure to define key statutory terms, and what appears to
be a significant drafting error. It offers tentative conclusions about
the scope of those terms, and thus the reach of the statute. It is too
early to say how helpful the TVPA will be in plugging even part of
the gap left by the judicial restriction of the ATS.

I.

The rise and fall of ATS litigation

The ATS has been interpreted to provide the federal courts with
jurisdiction over civil actions based on customary international law,
but in the past two decades the statute’s reach has been substantially
narrowed by judicial decisions. The ATS, which was passed as part of
the first Judiciary Act of 1789, gives the federal courts original
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”8
Beginning with a landmark decision in 1980, lower federal courts
held that the ATS provided a private cause of action under
international law. In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala9 the Second Circuit held
that held the ATS provided federal jurisdiction in a suit brought by
Paraguayan nationals against a citizen of Paraguay in United States
for wrongfully causing the death of their son by the use of torture.10
The court ended its opinion with language suggesting the federal
7.

Mary Catherine Hendrix, Enforcing the U.S. Trafficking Victims
Protection Act in Emerging Markets: The Challenge of Affecting Change
in India and China, 43 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 195 (2010).

8.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).

9.

Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).

10.

Id. at 878, 887.
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courts could play an important role in what it called “the ageless
dream” of freedom from gross human rights violations:
In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize
that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual
and collective interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed
by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of
physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the
torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding
today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our
First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment
of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.11

Human rights organizations and individual alien plaintiffs soon
adopted the strategy of suing corporations (rather than foreign
governments) under the ATS.12 Plaintiffs saw the ATS as offering
multiple advantages, including a neutral forum and favorable
substantive law, as well as “liberal pretrial discovery; . . . jury trials
in civil litigation; higher damage awards, including punitive damages;
class action litigation; contingent fee arrangements with counsel; the
absence of ‘loser pay’ rules for the unsuccessful party; and statutory
protections for international law violations.”13
In response to the explosion of ATS litigation, the federal courts
have cut back substantially on the statute’s effective reach. The
Supreme Court imposed two significant limitations. In Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain the Court limited the ATS to a narrow range of
well-established and specifically defined international law violations.14
11.

Id. at 890.

12.

See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and
the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L. J. 709, 718–19
(2012) (describing the shift in litigation strategy and noting dramatic
rise in ATS filings following suit against Unocal).

13.

Id. at 723 (quoting Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2008)).

14.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). The Court agreed
that the ATS provides a basis for jurisdiction but it found “no basis to
suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts
corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id.
Noting that “there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the
discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of
action of this kind,” it held that “courts should require any claim based
on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.” Id. at 725.
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In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum the Court held that the
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes bars alien
tort claims over conduct that does not “touch and concern the
territory of the United States … with sufficient force.”15 The lower
courts have generally understood the Kiobel ruling to bar all suits
based on tortious conduct that occurred solely overseas.16 However,
one lower court allowed an ATS suit alleging torture by U.S. military
contractors in Iraq to go forward.17 The lower federal courts have also
applied a variety of other doctrines to limit ATS suits, including
prudential or judicially created exhaustion remedies, forum non
conveniens, and heightened pleading standards.18 The decisions have
had a dramatic effect: by one count, within the first two years after
the decision in Kiobel, lower courts dismissed nearly 70 percent of the
cases brought under the key statute used by plaintiffs seeking relief
for human rights violations.19
Additionally, the question remains whether the ATS has any
application to corporate defendants.
The circuits split on the
question of whether corporations were subject to suit under the ATS,
with one influential circuit holding that corporate liability has not
been established as part of international law.20 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.21
15.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013).

16.

See David Nersessian, International Human Rights Litigation: A Guide
for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR. INT’L. LITIG. GUIDE, 2016, at 1, 25-8
(collecting cases). In particular, many “foreign-cubed” cases—those
brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for conduct that
occurred on foreign soil—have been dismissed post Kiobel. Id. at 26-8.

17.

See Foreign Relations Law — Alien Tort Statute — Fourth Circuit
Allows Alien Tort Statute Claim Against Abu Ghraib Contractor. – Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir.
2014), 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1534 (2015) (discussing Al Shimari v. CACI
Premier Technology, Inc., 758 F3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014)).

18.

Childress, supra note 12, at 728-30. The Supreme Court’s decisions on
general personal jurisdiction have also taken a toll on human rights
litigation. See Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General Personal
Jurisdiction Over Transnational Corporations for Federal Causes of
Action, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV. 617, 634-56 (2017) (collecting cases that
reflect the modern development of the ATS).

19.

John B. Bellinger III & R. Reeves Anderson, As Kiobel Turns Two:
How the Supreme Court is Leaving the Details to Lower Courts, 2015
U.S.
CHAMBER
INST.
FOR
LEGAL
REFORM
1,
1,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Kiobel_v6.pdf
[perma.cc/A92V-FQCL].

20.

Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117, 145
(2d Cir. 2010), aff’d other grounds, 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013)
(rejecting corporate liability under the ATS) with Doe I v. Nestle USA,
Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’s denied, 788 F.3d 946,
946 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming earlier circuit precedent finding no
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The judicial decisions restricting the availability of the ATS
reflect concerns about the judiciary’s institutional competence and the
proper allocation of authority within the federal constitutional system.
Influential scholars have argued that the judicial development of
international law norms without the clear sanction of and direction
from the political branches violates the constitutional principles of
federalism and separation of powers.22 One scholar summed up the
current state of affairs:
[T]here appears to be federal-court recognition that either
Congress is unconcerned with activities occurring abroad absent
clear statutory language expressing such a concern, or that
courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate such cases even though
they may have subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. These
legal concerns dovetail with other public-policy concerns that
courts may be taking [into] account . . . .23

These decisions are relevant to the present discussion for two
reasons. First, litigants who can no longer rely on the ATS are
seeking alterative ground for their claims, and in some cases they
have turned to the TVPA.24 That pressure will intensify if the
Supreme Court concludes that the ATS is not applicable to
corporations. Second, the judicial attitudes that undergirded the cases
construing the ATS may affect the courts’ construction of the TVPA.

II. The TVPA: new options
The TVPA had its origins in the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act, which was enacted in 2000.25 The Act’s two
primary purposes were “[t]o combat trafficking in persons, especially
into the sex trade, slavery, and involuntary servitude, [and] to
legitimate reason for a complete bar on corporate liability under the
ATS).
21.

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, cert. granted (April 3, 2017),
argued (Oct. 10, 2017).

22.

See Childress, supra note 12, at 710, 719-21, 726-27 (describing the
scholarly debate).

23.

Id. at 736.

24.

See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190 (5th Cir.
2017) and Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 324-5 (2d. Cir. 2012)
(demonstrating how early efforts to rely on the extraterritorial
jurisdiction under the TVPA failed because the courts held that the
TVPA’s grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction did not apply
retroactively).

25.

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
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reauthorize certain Federal programs to prevent violence against
women.”26 The provisions of the Act dealing with human trafficking
have been widely known as the TVPA.27 Several features of the
original legislation are significant from the perspective of international
human rights litigation. Pairing criminal provisions with provisions
authorizing funding—which require periodic reauthorization—
prompted Congress to return to the topic of human trafficking at
regular intervals and expand the reach of the TVPA. Often, the
groups lobbying for funding and their supporters in Congress and the
executive branch used funding legislation as an occasion to make
substantive changes intended to strengthen the TVPA. Second, the
trafficking legislation enjoyed bipartisan (and often near-universal)
support. Perhaps for that reason, congress enacted the changes
intended to strengthen the TVPA with little scrutiny. Unfortunately,
the resulting legislation contained some serious flaws.
A.

Labor trafficking and the origins of the TVPA

Although Congress’s primary concern has been sex trafficking
(especially that involving children), from the outset the TVPA
offenses also included forced labor and trafficking with respect to
Widespread media coverage and NGO activity
forced labor.28
following a 1995 investigation in El Monte, California helped to
galvanize support for the TVPA.29 Seventy-two Thai workers had
been forced to live and work making garments in a compound
surrounded by a barbed wire fence; some had been held there for as
long as seven years.30 In 2000, an unclassified report on human
trafficking written by a State Department analyst under the auspices
of the Central Intelligence Agency provided a broader perspective,
including a statistical analysis of people being trafficked in the United

26.

Id.

27.

See, e.g., Remedying the Injustices of Human Trafficking Through Tort
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2574, 2574–5 (2006) [hereinafter Remedying
Injustices]; Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a
Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the
Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 337, 338 (2007). Some courts and commentators refer to the
portions of the TVPA added by later amendments as the TVPRA, but
for simplicity this essay will use refer throughout to the TVPA.

28.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-90 (2008) (prohibiting forced labor and trafficking
with respect to forced labor).

29.

Kevin Bales, Laurel Fletcher & Eric Stover, Hidden Slaves Forced Labor
in the United States, 23 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 47, 57 (2005) [hereinafter
Hidden Slaves].

30.

Id.
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States.31 Both events contributed to the TVPA’s initial passage.32 The
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act—including the
TVPA—enjoyed near-universal Congressional support.33
B.

Broadening the TVPA

The linkage of program funding and substantive provisions
provided an opportunity for multiple changes in the substantive
provisions of the TVPA.34 Periodic consideration of legislation
authorizing the allocation of funds35 created regular opportunities for
public interest groups and law enforcement agencies to advocate for
substantive changes to the TVPA.36 Several of the amendments
adopted in the periodic reauthorization process added features better
adapting the TVPA as a mechanism to impose liability on
corporations for human rights violations.

31.

Remedying Injustices, supra note 27, at 2574 (citing AMY O’NEILL
RICHARD, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY
MANIFESTATION OF SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME 3 (2000), available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/books-and-monographs/trafficking.pdf
[perma.cc/CKP6DGQP]).

32.

Hidden Slaves, supra note 29, at 57.

33.

H.R.3244 - Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/houseCONGRESS.GOV,
bill/3244/all-actions?overview=closed&q=%7B%22roll-callvote%22%3A%22all%22%7D [perma.cc/7GEG-VY6Y]. The Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 was sponsored by
Representative Christopher Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, who
secured 36 cosponsors, 19 Republicans and 17 Democrats. Less than a
year after its introduction, the bill passed the House (371-1) and the
Senate (95-0). Id.

34.

Every version of the TVPA has provided funding only for a limited
number of future years. The 2000 Reauthorization provided funding
through fiscal year 2002. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). The
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Reauthorization]
provided funding through fiscal year 2005. The Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat.
3558 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 Reauthorization] provided funding through
fiscal year 2007.

35.

Compare Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-386, §113, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (appropriating “the
Attorney General $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2001 and $10,000,000 for
fiscal year 2002”) with 2003 Reauthorization, at § 7 (appropriating the
Attorney General “$5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2004 and
2005”).

36.

See 2003 Reauthorization § 7 (amending the TVPA).
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From the perspective of corporate liability, critical amendments in
2003 and 2008 (1) created an offense of benefitting from forced labor,37
(2) authorized extraterritorial jurisdiction over TVPA offenses,38 and
(3) authorized a civil cause of action for victims39 as well as
mandatory restitution40 and forfeiture.41 Like the initial legislation in
2000, these amendments received strong bipartisan support in
Congress, 42 and they sailed through Congress with little dispute, or
even scrutiny.43
C.

Relevant offenses

As amended, the TVPA creates six new offenses: (1) forced
labor,44 (2) benefitting financially from forced labor, (3) trafficking
with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced
labor,45 (4) sex trafficking and benefitting from sex trafficking of
children,46 (5) unlawful conduct with respect to related documents,47
37.

William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5068 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 1589) [hereinafter Wilberforce Act].

38.

Id. at 5071 (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1596).

39.

2003 Reauthorization, supra note 34 at 2878 (enacting 18 U.S.C. §
1595); Wilberforce Act, supra note 37 at 5067 (amending 18 U.S.C. §
1589).

40.

Wilberforce Act, supra note 37 at 5067 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1593).

41.

Id. (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1593).

42.

Representative Smith sponsored the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2003, which passed the House, 422-1, and passed
the Senate by unanimous consent. All Information (Except Text) for
H.R.2620 - Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/houseCONGRESS.GOV,
bill/2620/all-info?r=1 [perma.cc/YY88-KQ3Y] [hereinafter Information
for 2003 Reauthorization]. Representative Howard Berman, a Democrat
from California, sponsored the 2008 Reauthorization. Representative
Smith was a cosponsor, along with two other Republicans and three
Democrats. The legislation passed the House without objection and
Senate with unanimous consent. All Information (Except Text) for
H.R.7311 - William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization
Act
of
2008,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/7311/allinfo?r=1
[perma.cc/5KTK-3L6L]
[hereinafter
Information
for
Wilberforce Act].

43.

Information for 2003 Reauthorization, supra note 42; Information for
Wilberforce Act, supra note 42.

44.

18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008).

45.

Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2008).

46.

18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2008).

47.

18 U.S.C. § 1592 (2008).
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and (6) benefitting financially from other TVPA offenses.48 The new
offenses were added to Chapter 77 of Title 18, supplementing
Reconstruction-era offenses such as peonage,49 sale into involuntary
servitude,50 and various offenses concerning slavery.51
1.

Forced labor and trafficking with respect to forced labor

The forced labor and trafficking offenses cover a wide range of
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) defines the forced labor offense to
include knowingly providing or obtaining the labor or services of a
person by any of the following means (or “any combination” of them):
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or
threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that
person or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal
process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause
the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such
labor or services, that person or another person would suffer
serious harm or physical restraint . . . . 52

Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 1590 defines trafficking to include
“knowingly” recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or
obtaining “by any means, any person for labor or services in violation
of this chapter.”53 This encompasses not only trafficking forced labor
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1589, but also the peonage, slavery, and
servitude offenses in Chapter 77.
2.

Benefitting from forced labor and trafficking

From the perspective of potential corporate liability, it is
significant that liability for forced labor and trafficking reaches not
48.

18 U.S.C. § 1593A (2008). Although this statute’s caption is
“Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in
persons,” see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text, there is a
mismatch between the caption and the conduct covered in the body of
the statute.

49.

18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000).

50.

18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012).

51.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1585-88 (offenses include seizure, detention, or sale of
slaves; service on vessels in slave trade; possession of slaves aboard
vessel; and transportation of slaves from United States).

52.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)-(4) (2008).

53.

18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2008).
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only those who commit the offenses defined by the TVPA, but also
certain parties who benefit from the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b),
added in 2008, extends liability to anyone who
. . . knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the
providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of the means
described in subsection (a), knowing or in reckless disregard of
the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of such means . . . .54
3.

Benefitting from other TVPA violations

18 U.S.C. § 1593A has a similar structure, criminalizing the
knowing receipt of a financial benefit or thing of value “from
participation in a venture” with knowledge or reckless disregard that
the venture has engaged in other TVPA violations.55 Although the
caption indicates this provision extends liability for benefitting from
the trafficking of persons,56 as discussed below it may not reach some
of the conduct referred to in the caption.57
D.

Civil remedies, forfeiture, and restitution

The TVPA also provides a range of remedies for the victims of
the offenses defined in Chapter 77, including the Reconstruction-era
offenses and those defined by the TVPA. Taken together, these
provisions provide victims with an incentive to report violations,
cooperate with criminal investigations, and bring civil actions in the
absence of criminal prosecution.
The TVPA provides for mandatory restitution of “the full amount
of the victim’s losses,” including “the greater of the gross income or
value to the defendant of the victim’s services or labor or the value of
the victim’s labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and
overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201
et seq.).”58
The civil remedy, included in the 2003 reauthorization, provides
that any victim of an offense under Chapter 77 may “bring a civil
action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a
venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in

54.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008).

55.

18 U.S.C. § 1593A (2008).

56.

See id. (“Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in
persons.”).

57.

See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.

58.

18 U.S.C. § 1593(a)(3) (2008).
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an act in violation of this chapter).”59 The civil remedy includes
“damages and reasonable attorney’s fees.”60 The civil action is subject
to the restriction that it “shall be stayed during the pendency of any
criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the
claimant is the victim.”61 The statute defines criminal action broadly
to include “investigation and prosecution . . . until final adjudication
in the trial court.”62
This provision offers several advantages. First, although the
TVPA already provided for victims to receive restitution through
criminal proceedings,63 they may seek a civil remedy when prosecutors
do not file charges. Second, it empowers victims to personally
confront their victimizers in court.64 Third, the damages awarded in
civil cases may additionally deter human trafficking.65 However, as
noted, any civil action will be stayed if there is an ongoing criminal
prosecution, or even just an investigation.
Finally, the TVPA requires mandatory criminal forfeiture of the
proceeds of the offense and property used to facilitate the offense, and
it directs the Attorney General to transfer forfeited assets and
proceeds to satisfy victim restitution under its provisions.66
Restitution has priority over all other claims.67
E.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction

The 2008 amendments to the TVPA added language expressly
providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over the new trafficking
offenses as well as some of the Reconstruction-era offenses.68 In
addition to domestic or territorial jurisdictional otherwise available, it
adds extraterritorial jurisdiction over the enumerated offenses (and
attempts and conspiracies to commit them) whenever:
(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as those terms
are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); or
59.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015).

60.

Id.

61.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) (2015).

62.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(2) (2015).

63.

18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2008).

64.

Remedying Injustices, supra note 27, at 2585.

65.

Id.

66.

18 U.S.C. § 1594(d)-(f) (2015).

67.

18 U.S.C. § 1594(f)(2) (2015).

68.

18 U.S.C. § 1596(a)(2) (2008).
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(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender.69

However, this jurisdiction has an unusual limitation on dual
prosecutions. If another foreign government is prosecuting a person
“for the conduct constituting the offense,” a U.S. prosecution under
the TVPA may not be brought without “the approval of the Attorney
General or the Deputy Attorney General (or a person acting in either
such capacity), which function of approval may not be delegated.”70
F.

Cases that do—and do not—fall within the TVPA

As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the TVPA cannot reach
the wide range of cases that were brought under the ATS prior to the
Supreme Court’s limiting decisions. For example, in Kiobel, Nigerian
nationals residing in United States sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian
corporations pursuant to Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Plaintiffs alleged
that corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria, including
aiding and abetting atrocities including attacking villages, where they
beat, raped, killed, and arrested residents, and destroyed or looted
property.71 The plaintiffs in Filártiga were Paraguayan nationals who
sought relief from a citizen of Paraguay for wrongfully causing the
death of their son by the use of torture. 72 Neither case would fall
within the TVPA, which focuses exclusively on offenses related to
forced labor, including sex and labor trafficking.
But the TVPA may provide a remedy—and define crimes—for
conduct alleged in other cases originally brought under the ATS. For
example, in Doe v. Nestle SA,73 a class action, Malian plaintiffs
alleged that they were trafficked as young children into the Ivory
Coast to harvest and grow cocoa beans.74 These farms sold the cocoa
to the defendants, Nestle, Cargill, and Archer Daniels Midland.75 The
plaintiffs’ accounts of their treatment are similar.76 They worked 12 to
69.

18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2008).

70.

18 U.S.C. § 1596(b) (2008) (applying only to situations where the
foreign government is acting “in accordance with jurisdiction recognized
by the United States….”).

71.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 111–113 (2013).

72.

Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).

73.

Doe v. Nestle SA, 748 F.Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

74.

Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶ 1,
Doe v. Nestle SA, 748 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D. Cal 2010) (No. CV 055133-SVM-MRW).

75.

Id.

76.

See id. at ¶¶ 57-59.
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14 hour days six days a week and were unpaid.77 They faced corporal
punishment for attempted escapes.78 The class includes everyone
forced to labor on the farms in several named regions of Ivory Coast.79
The complaint further alleges that Ivory Coast’s “cocoa hierarchy”
benefits from an “Enron-type structure” through which secret bank
accounts and front companies insulate beneficiaries.80 Approximately
70% of the world’s cocoa supply comes from the Ivory Coast, and a
majority of the U.S.’s cocoa supply comes from these three
defendants.81 All three defendants regularly sent employees from
headquarters to inspect operations in the Ivory Coast.82 The
companies entered exclusive buyer-seller relationships with different
farms.83 Through these agreements, the complaint alleges, the
companies had the power to set labor standards, which would have
prevented the alleged abuse.84
The complaint in Doe v. Nestle SA shows the potential of the
TVPA’s civil cause of action to reach certain forms of human rights
violations in corporate supply chains. Nestle is a Swiss company.85
Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland are American.86 Plaintiffs sued
both the parent companies and subsidiaries of Nestle (Nestle S.A.,
Nestle U.S.A., and Nestle Cote d’Ivoire)87 and Cargill (Cargill, Inc.,
Cargill Cocoa, and Cargill West Africa).88 The allegations might
support civil or criminal liability under the TVPA on at least two
theories: (1) the defendants knowingly benefitted from participation in
a venture including the plaintiffs’ forced labor, knowingly or in
reckless disregard of the means used, and (2) the defendants aided
and abetted the labor trafficking that brought plaintiffs to the farms
where plaintiffs were held against their will and forced to work.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at ¶ 11.

80.

Id. at ¶ 31.

81.

Id. at ¶ 32.

82.

Id. at ¶¶ 34.

83.

Id. at ¶ 34-35.

84.

Id at ¶¶ 35-44.

85.

Id. at ¶ 18.

86.

Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.

87.

Id. at ¶¶ 18-20.

88.

Id. at ¶¶ 22-24.
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III. Drafting problems and key unknowns
A.

The scope of the forced labor and benefit offenses

Although some case law is developing on the question what
constitutes forced labor under subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 1589,89
two key phrases in subsection (b) have critical importance in cases
involving corporate responsibility for forced labor: (1) benefitting
financially and (2) participation in a venture. To date, these issues
have received virtually no attention from the courts.
1.

Benefitting

Section 1589 proscribes “benefit[ting] financially by receiving
anything of value.”90 The statute does not define benefitting.91 In the
context of forced labor, the core of the definition seems fairly clear.
For example, in the case of the conduct alleged in Doe v. Nestle SA,
the concept of benefit should include purchasing cocoa for a lower
price because forced labor reduced the cost of production. The
89.

See, e.g., Muchira v. Al_Rawaf, 850 F.3d 605, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2017)
(“Typically, therefore, “forced labor” situations involve circumstances
such as squalid or otherwise intolerable living conditions, extreme
isolation (from family and the outside world), threats of inflicting harm
upon the victim or others (including threats of legal process such as
arrest or deportation), and exploitation of the victim’s lack of education
and familiarity with the English language, all of which are “used to
prevent [vulnerable] victims from leaving and to keep them bound to
their captors.”) (quoting United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 619
(6th Cir. 2015) and collecting cases). Many of the cases are fact-bound
discussion by district courts ruling on pretrial motion to dismiss. See,
e.g., Echon v. Sackett, No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW, 2017 WL 4181417
at *13-16 (finding allegations of forced labor sufficient to deny, in part,
motion to dismiss); Stein v. World-Wide Plumbing Supply Inc., 71 F.
Supp. 3d 320, 327-29 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) (claiming that plaintiff was
forced to work as monitor, not paid, and defendants benefitted sufficient
to survive motion to dismiss claim of forced labor under 18 U.S.C. §
1589, but not to state a claim for peonage enticement into slavery).

90.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2008).

91.

Section 1589(b) does require that a defendant knowingly benefit
“financially or by receiving anything of value.” Although the phrase
“anything of value” is not defined, it is similar to the phrase “thing of
value,” which is used in many federal criminal statutes and generally
defined broadly to include both tangible and intangible benefits,
including anything of subjective value to the recipient. NORMAN
ABRAMS, SARA BEALE, & SUSAN KLEIN., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 190–92 (6th ed. 2015). The issue was raised in a case
involving both forced labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 and sex trafficking
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, and the court construed the phrase in
accordance with these general principles. Riccio v. McLean, 853 F.3d
553, 556 (1st Cir. 2017). Accord United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983,
988-89 (8th Cir. 2015) (same in sex trafficking case under § 1591).
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question is whether “benefit[]” should be read to be extend
substantially further.
Many transactions involve intermediaries, and it may be desirable
to interpret the concept of benefit more broadly to reach farther along
the supply chain. As an economic matter, Nestle would benefit from
forced labor and lower production costs whether it purchased cocoa
directly from the farmers who cut costs by using forced labor, or from
a middleman who purchased the cocoa from the same farms. It would
undercut the goals of the TVPA to allow producers like Nestle to
insulate themselves from liability simply by introducing an
intermediary, rather than sending their own purchasing agents into
the field. Assuming courts accept this line of reasoning, what if there
are multiple intermediaries and transactions between the farmers and
Nestle? Assuming the other statutory requirements are met, including
knowledge or reckless disregard of the use of forced labor, would two,
or three, or more intervening transactions break the benefit chain? If
the benefit chain extends through multiple transactions, note that the
final step in the chain is the consumer. American consumers clearly
do benefit financially from the lower prices that result from forced
labor in multiple industries. But it seems far-fetched to say that the
TVPA should be construed to impose criminal liability on consumers
who purchased Nestle chocolate bars if they were aware of media
reports demonstrating that the cocoa originated in farms employing
forced labor, and hence arguably acting with reckless disregard.92
In the alternative, courts could interpret benefit to focus on the
producer’s ability to gain a competitive advantage in U.S. consumer
markets by reducing the cost of ingredients. This theory would have
at least two advantages: it would not extend to consumers and it
might have jurisdictional significance. Note that if the receipt of the
benefit occurs where the sale is made, outside the United States, it
would seem to require extraterritorial jurisdiction. In contrast, the
competitive advantage, and resulting “benefit,” would occur in the
United States.
2.

Participation in a venture

Section 1589 requires that the benefit be obtained “from
participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in

92.

But cf. Rachael Revesz, Nestle is being sued for allegedly using child
slaves
on
cocoa
farms,
INDEPENDENT,
July
11,
2016,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/nestle-is-beingsued-for-allegedly-using-child-slaves-on-cocoa-farms-a6806646.html
[perma.cc/7MYG-R96S] (quoting policy director at campaign group at
International Baby Food Action, who stated, “‘Every time you eat their
chocolate you are benefitting from child slavery.’”).
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subsection (a).”93 The lack of any statutory definition of the terms
“participation” and “venture” is problematic, because even their core
meaning in this context is uncertain.94
There is one plausible statutory source of a definition of
“venture,” but it raises a series of problems. The TVPA sex
trafficking provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(5), provides a definition of
the term, but only for “this section.” Section 1591(c)(5) provides that
“[t]he term ‘venture’ means any group of two or more individuals
associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.”95 If Congress had
intended this definition to apply throughout the TVPA (or at least to
§ 1589 as well as § 1591), it would have been easy to say so. Indeed,
one could argue that the textual limitation makes it clear that the
definition in § 1591(c)(5) was not intended to apply to cases under §
1589. But Supreme Court precedent suggests that it would be proper
to carry the definition over.96 In construing RICO’s pattern
requirement, the Supreme Court considered and rejected a similar
argument made by Justice Scalia, consulting a definition contained in
another section of the legislation and not referenced in RICO itself.97
Assuming that courts consult § 1591(c)(5) when construing §
1589, they will encounter a new set of difficulties. Section 1591(c)(5)’s
“associated in fact” language tracks, in part, RICO’s definition of the
term “enterprise.”98 The courts have struggled to define the term
under the RICO statute, generating an extensive body of case law

93.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008).

94.

See Riccio v. McClean, 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017) (reversing the
dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim, the court emphasized
plaintiff’s allegations that motel owners, who resided at their motel,
knew their long term tenant was physically abusing plaintiff and forcing
her to have sex in the motel room, and were associated with tenant’s
efforts to force the plaintiff to engage in sex for money).

95.

18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5) (2008).

96.

See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1989) (drawing
on definition of “pattern” in another title of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, which also included RICO and not included in
RICO), id. at 251, 252 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that when
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it from another section of the same statute, it is “generally
presumed Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23 (1983)).

97.

Id.

98.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2016) (“‘enterprise’ includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity . . . .”).
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defining criteria for groups of individuals deemed to be associated in
fact for this purpose.99
Whether the courts will consider decisions construing RICO as
applicable to this language in the TVPA remains unclear. RICO
raises distinctive policy concerns that undergird decisions seeking to
impose limitations, and these concerns may not apply to TVPA
litigation. The first concern reflected in the RICO cases is that the
powerful incentives arising from the availability of treble damage and
attorneys’ fees could swamp the courts with civil cases that bear little
or no relation to the concerns that animated Congress in enacting
RICO.100 This concern does not apply to the TVPA, which does not
provide for trebled damages. The second concern arises from the
courts’ search for criteria that meaningfully distinguish RICO
violations—with large additional penalties—from garden-variety
conspiracies (themselves associations in fact).101 Again, this concern
does not directly apply to the definition of “venture” under the
TVPA, because the elements of the TVPA clearly distinguish it from
a garden-variety conspiracy. Because of its mens rea terms, the TVPA
benefit offense is broader than (and hence statutorily distinct from) a
conspiracy to commit forced labor violations.102 The TVPA benefit
offense requires only that the defendant knowingly benefit with at
least recklessness with regard to the venture’s use of forced labor.103 In
contrast, conspirators must have the specific intent to promote the
conspiracy’s object (such as the forced labor offenses).104 Although the
99.

See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (concluding that a
RICO enterprise composed of a individuals “associated in fact” must
have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among
those associated, and longevity; but rejecting arguments that must have
structural features such as hierarchy, role differentiation, and a chain of
command), and Abrams, supra note 91, at 890–96 (reviewing issues
arising in construing associated-in-fact enterprises cases following Boyle).

100. Abrams, supra note 91, at 875 (discussing expressions of judicial
concerns about the frequent inclusion of RICO claims in ordinary
business disputes and judicial “glosses” intended to make it more
difficult to bring RICO claims).
101. Id. at 940.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008).
103. Id.
104. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 432–34 (6th ed.
2012) (noting the question whether this requires purpose, or knowledge
of the object offense suffices). Of course a person or entity benefitting
from forced labor could also conspire to violate the forced labor statute
by entering into an agreement with those committing the labor
violations with the requisite specific intent. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(b) makes it
an offense to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and provides that the
conspiracy carries the same punishment as the object offense. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1594(b) (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008).
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mens rea requirement distinguishes the TVPA from RICO, the
comparison with conspiracy law highlights the potential breadth of
the TVPA benefit offenses. Indeed, some courts might consider the
TVPA’s low mens rea as a factor supporting a narrow construction of
the term venture.
The statute also lacks a definition of participation. What does it
mean to “participate in a venture”? Courts might construe this term
to place an effective limitation on the meaning of benefit in this
context. If there are multiple intermediaries between the
manufacturers and the farms on which forced labor occurs, does the
manufacturer participate in the venture of the farm? Although the
text provides no guide, intuitively the answer seems to be that it does
not. However, the RICO litigation suggests that the adept drafting of
complaints and indictments may cast the same facts in a very
different light.105 Perhaps the venture is not merely the farm, but
rather should be understood more broadly as those who run the farm
and some of the intermediaries, especially if they are repeat players.
This understanding of participation in a venture would eliminate the
incentive to create intermediate entities merely to cut off liability, and
it would also be broadly consistent with the current practice of
creating multinational supply chains over which U.S. producers exert
substantial oversight and control. For example, Apple’s suppliers
employ millions of people worldwide, and Apple itself claims
responsibility to “protect the rights of all the people in [its] supply
chain. . . .”106 In upholding this responsibility, Apple has a supplier
code of conduct containing standards for “safe working conditions
[and] fair treatment of workers . . . .”107 Apple states publicly that it
conducts “regular assessments” to test employer compliance with its
code of conduct.108
B.

Drafting error and omissions in 18 U.S.C. § 1593A

18 U.S.C. § 1593A has even more serious drafting problems. Like
the benefit offense in § 1589(b), Congress added § 1593A in 2008.109
It appears that Congress intended to create a benefit offense broadly
applicable to the other sections of the TVPA. Section 1593A’s caption
refers to “Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking
in persons,” and it proscribes knowingly benefitting from participation
105. See Abrams, supra note 91, at 897–901 (describing alternative ways of
defining an enterprise based on the same facts).
106. APPLE, Supplier Responsibility, https://www.apple.com/ae/supplierresponsibility/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Wilberforce Act, supra note 37; 18 U.S.C. § 1593A (2008).
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in a venture engaging in certain violations, with knowledge or reckless
disregard of the venture’s violations. It lists three sections: 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1581(a), 1592, and 1595. Surprisingly, however, only one of the
listed sections conforms to the caption. Section 1581(a) proscribes
peonage. But neither section 1592 nor 1595 refers to either slavery or
trafficking. To the contrary, 18 U.S.C. § 1592 proscribes only unlawful
conduct with respect to certain documents, such as passports, in
connection with offenses under Chapter 77. And 18 U.S.C. § 1595
contains no criminal offense; it creates the civil cause of action for
victims of TVPA violations. There is no question that this was
simply a drafting error.110
The drafting error appears to leave a gap in the statutory scheme.
Although 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1593A, and 18 U.S.C. §
1591(a)(2) impose liability for benefitting from forced labor, peonage,
and sex trafficking, no comparable provision imposes criminal liability
for benefitting from labor trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a).
Moreover, the gap in criminal liability creates an equivalent gap in
civil liability.111
Although courts occasionally rely on the doctrine of the
scrivener’s error as support for construing a statute or rule in
conformity with the drafter’s clear intent,112 the courts should not
employ that doctrine to close the gap in § 1593A. The precise result
intended by Congress is not clear,113 and in any event new criminal

110. For a discussion on lacking criminal provisions in the Wilberforce Act,
see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL40190, THE WILLIAM
WILBERFORCE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION
ACT OF 2008 (P.L. 110-457): CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS (2009).
111. Lagasan v. Al-Ghasel, 92 F. Supp. 3d 445, 449, 454-55 (E.D. Va. 2015)
(holding a default judgment for a civil claim based on the assumption
that § 1593A created an offense of knowingly benefitting from violations
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584 and 1590, which are not included in the text of §
1593A).
112. See United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting the
analysis in United States v. Rudolph, 224 F.R.D. 503, 504-11 (N.D. Ala.
2004) where the court rejected a literal reading of restyled Fed. R. Crim.
P. 16(a) because it would go far beyond a stylistic change, altering the
scope of the protection afforded to government work product).
113. There are a variety of possibilities as to Congress’ intention in drafting §
1593A. While the inclusion of § 1595 is clearly in error, it is less certain
that § 1592 was included in error, as it does proscribe misuse of
documents related to trafficking and slavery. It is additionally unclear
which statute(s) Congress intended to include in lieu of any errors.
However, this alone does not necessarily bring the text of § 1593A in
line with its caption, since § 1592 does not go to “slavery” in general. It
is possible that § 1592 should have been § 1584 (prohibiting involuntary
servitude). There is only minimal support for any one interpretation of
Congress’ intent for § 1593A over another. Doyle, supra note 110, at 9
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liability should not be recognized in the absence of a properly enacted
act of Congress. To do so would create a common law crime.114
C.

Applicability of the TVPA offenses and civil liability to
corporations

Although the defendants in Doe v. Nestle SA moved to dismiss on
the grounds, inter alia, that the TVPA offenses and civil cause of
action do not apply to corporations,115 that argument seems unlikely
to succeed. Federal criminal statutes such as the TVPA are generally
applicable to corporations. The Dictionary Act defines commonly used
terms throughout the United States Code and by its terms provides:
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ or ‘whoever’
include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”116
Courts have relied on the Dictionary Act’s inclusive definition to
give meaning to the words “person” or “whoever” in the context of
criminal statutes.117 Although some federal regulatory statutes do
specifically include corporations as being subject to the law,118 the
Dictionary Act provides the default rule that a statute need not
specifically include terms extending liability to corporations. Section
1589’s prohibitions on forced labor and benefitting from forced labor
ventures both apply to “[w]hoever” engages in the prohibited
conduct.”119 In conformity with the Dictionary Act, these provisions
should be held to apply to corporations (and other legal entities) as
well as natural persons.

(suggesting that Congress intended to refer to § 1590 (trafficking more
generally) when drafting § 1593A).
114. Cf. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812) (holding that there are
no federal common law crimes).
115. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendants Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co.; Nestle, U.S.A.,; and Cargill, Inc. to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim upon
which Relief can be Granted: Memorandum of Points and Authorities at
19–22, Doe v. Nestle SA, 748 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV
05-5133-SVM-MRW).
116. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
117. See e.g., A&P Trucking Co., 358 US at 123 (addressing corporate
violation of Interstate Commerce Commission safety regulations); see
also Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449, 454-55 (2012)
(citing the Dictionary Act and contrasting use of term “individual,”
which refers to natural persons, with the terms persons and whoever,
which generally refer to corporations as well as natural persons).
118. See, e.g., 15 USC § 78(c)(a)(1), (9) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 321(e) (2012).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)-(b) (2012).
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It seems equally clear that the TVPA provision authorizing civil
damages should apply to corporations that have violated the criminal
provisions of the act. Looking first to the text, § 1595(a) gives no hint
that the cause of action is limited to natural persons. It authorizes the
victim to bring a civil cause of action against “the perpetrator” of a
violation as well as “whoever knowingly benefits . . . .”120 If a
corporation has violated the forced labor offense it is a “perpetrator,”
and if it knowingly benefits in violation of § 1589(b) it would fall
within the second clause of § 1595(a). Sound policy also supports this
result. There is no reason to shield corporate—but not individual—
defendants from civil liability based on their criminal conduct.
Construing the TVPA to exempt corporations from liability would
significantly undermine the goal of making the victims of forced labor
crimes whole, since corporate defendants are more likely than
individuals to have the funds necessary to pay the victim’s damages,
plus attorneys’ fees.
Although the issue has not arisen in TVPA criminal prosecutions,
the TVPA’s civil provisions have been used successfully against
corporations. In one such case, Filipino teachers sued the recruiting
agency that fraudulently induced them to participate by not revealing
large fees they would have to pay later, held their visas and passports,
and threatened them with deportation when they complained about
poor treatment.121 The district court held that the complaint stated a
claim for violations of forced labor and other TVPA offenses,122 and it
certified approximately 250 teachers as a class.123 In another case,
detainees at a for-profit immigration detention center successfully
sued the management company under the TVPA for threatening
them with solitary confinement in the event they failed to complete
particular, unpaid chores.124 The plaintiffs succeeded, and the case
confirmed that the TVPA covers all forced labor, even labor
performed by those who are not being trafficked.125 Neither case
explicitly considered whether the TVPA was applicable to artificial
entities.
On the other hand, a few courts have ruled that government
entities cannot be sued for TVPA violations. In a case brought
against the University of Oklahoma, the court ruled that the TVPA
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015).
121. Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., 790 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1145
(C.D. Cal. 2011).
122. Id. at 1143-48.
123. Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., No. LA CV10-01172 JAK, 2011
WL 7095434, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011).
124. Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc, 113 F.Supp.3d 1125, 1128 (D. Colo. 2015).
125. Id. at 1132–33.
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did not abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity.126 A district court
took a different tack, relying on the language of the TVPA and the
Dictionary Act to conclude that § 1595 does not authorize relief
against a government entity, such as a local school board.127
D.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction

Although Congress expressly provided for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over the new TVPA offenses, the statutory language
leaves open two important questions: (1) whether (and under what
circumstances) corporations are subject to extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction, and (2) whether the TVPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction
extends to civil actions. The answer to these questions will help
determine whether the TVPA can be employed to close part of the
gap left by the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting the reach of the
ATS.
Unfortunately, the sparse legislative history provides virtually no
guidance on these questions. The jurisdictional provision received
little attention when the 2008 amendments were enacted. The House
Report regarding the 2008 Reauthorization included “facilitating
extraterritorial prosecutions against international trafficking
criminals” in its list of “[k]ey provisions relating to combatting
trafficking in the United States,”128 but it provides no further
information on the scope of the jurisdictional provisions.129 Congress
seems to have modeled § 1596(a) on the jurisdictional provisions
governing genocide prosecutions,130 but no court has considered the
question of its applicability to corporations under either statute.
Thus, this analysis will focus on the text, in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions construing another similar term and
considering the extraterritorial application of other laws.131
126. Mojsilovic v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Univ. of Okla., 841 F.3d
1129, 1131-33 (10th Cir. 2016).
127. Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., No. SACV 10-1172-AG
(MLGx), 2011 WL 13153190 at *10-12 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2011).
128. H.R. Rep. No. 110-430, pt. 1, at 35 (2007).
129. The only other reference to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the report
comes in the section by section analysis, which states that section 22 of
the bill “provides jurisdiction for U.S. courts for prosecution of certain
slavery and trafficking offenses committed abroad.” Id. at 55.
130. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2012) (stating the genocide jurisdictional
provisions were enacted the year before the TVPA provisions, and the
language is virtually identical), with 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e)(2) (2012)
(showing that genocide provisions do include some bases of jurisdiction
that are not present in the TVPA—offenses “committed in whole or
part in the United States,” and offenses allegedly committed by “a
stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United States.”).
131. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012).
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1.

Applicability to corporations and other entities

The grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction enacted in 2008 extends
to TVPA offenses (including forced labor and benefitting from forced
labor) if:
(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as those terms
are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); or
(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender.132

Under subdivision (1), the critical term is “national.” If a
corporation is incorporated in the United States, or has its principal
place of business here, is it a “national of the United States” under
subsection (1)? Or are nationals—like permanent resident aliens—
necessarily individuals? Judged by the standards recently applied by
the Supreme Court, it appears that a corporation is a United States
national if it is incorporated in the United States, and perhaps also if
it has its principal place of business here.133
In Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority134 the Court considered the
question whether the statutory term “individual” includes
corporations under the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991,135 and
its decision provides guidance for analysis of the term “national” in
the TVPA. The Court turned first to multiple dictionaries to
determine the ordinary meaning of the term; it concluded that, when
used as a noun, “‘individual’ ordinarily means ‘[a] human being, a
person.’”136
In contrast, according to similar sources, the ordinary meaning of
the term “national” is not limited to human beings. For example, one
leading dictionary defines “national” as “a citizen or subject of a
particular nation who is entitled to its protection.”137 This seems
broad enough to encompass domestic corporations because they are
statutorily deemed to be U.S. citizens for some purposes, and they are
entitled to claim the protection of the United States and its laws.
The federal statutes governing diversity jurisdiction and removal
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a).
133. Mohamad, 566 U.S. 449.
134. Id.
135. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and accompanying note (2012)).
136. Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 454 (quoting 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 880
(2d ed. 1989).
137. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1279 (2001).

40

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
The Trafficking Victim Protection Act

provide that a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and
foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign
state where it has its principal place of business.”138 U.S. trade law also
entitles domestic corporations to protection against unfair competition by
companies from other countries.139 The Oxford English Dictionary,
which the Court relied on in Mohamad, provides another definition of
a “national” as “[a] representative of a nation.”140 Some corporations,
particularly state-owned or government-linked companies, are clearly
representatives of their nations,141 but other companies are closely
associated with and understood in a general sense to represent their
country of incorporation.142 Thus, the ordinary meaning of “national”
seems to include both natural persons and corporations.
In defining the term “individual” in Mohamad, the Supreme Court
also looked to the treatment of the term in other federal statutes,
finding that they “routinely distinguish between an ‘individual’ and
an organizational entity of some kind.”143 In contrast, the pattern of
statutory usage of the term “national” seems less clear. A few other
statutes distinguish “national[s] of the United States” from
corporations for purposes of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The statutes

138. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
139. For example, Boeing brought an anti-dumping case seeking high tariffs
on Canada’s Bombardier C series passenger jets. In October 2017, the
U.S. commerce department issued a preliminary decision stating that it
would impose an 80 per cent tariff on top of duties of 220 per cent
ordered in an earlier anti-subsidy decision that prompted a sharp
reaction from Canada and the UK. US orders new tariffs on Bombardier
jets, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 17, 2017. Although that decision was
reversed by the United States International Trade Commission, a quasijudicial body, it was part of a series of “trade skirmishes” that created
an “uneasy atmosphere between the longstanding allies” and became
“an international kerfuffle.” Ana Swanson, Boeing Denied Bid for
Tariffs on Canadian Jets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2018.
140. 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 234 (2d ed. 1989).
141. For example, the Canadian Broadcasting Company, which has no
shareholders, is a public company managed by a board of directors
appointed by Canada’s Governor in Council (who serves as the Queen’s
representative). See Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c 11, § 36(2) (Can.).
142. Like airlines and airline manufacturers, a nation’s large automakers are
often closely associated with its national identity and national interests,
giving rise to claims that what is good for GM—or another large U.S.
company—is good for the United States. For a discussion of the origins
of that phrase (which is frequently misquoted), see Robert W.
Patterson, Whatever happened to the “America” in “corporate
America”?
NATIONAL
REVIEW
(July
1,
2013),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2013/07/whats-good-america-robert-wpatterson/ [https://perma.cc/8B3T-ZN68].
143. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 455 (2012).
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providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of nuclear terrorism
and violence against maritime transport involving weapons of mass
destruction provide for jurisdiction when the offense is committed by
a “national of the United States” or “a United States corporation or
legal entity.”144 On the other hand, statutes do not use this
terminology consistently. For example, a statute governing loan
guarantees deems a corporation a “citizen or national of the United
States,”145 and a provision on customs duties defines the term “United
States citizen” to include “any individual who is a citizen or national
of the United States” and “any corporation, partnership, association,
or other legal entity organized or existing under the laws of the
United States or any State.”146
Subdivision (2) provides an alternative ground for extraterritorial
jurisdiction when the accused is “present in the United States.” It
seems relatively clear that companies are “present” in this sense when
they are incorporated in the United States or have their principal
place of business here. (Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that,
for purposes of civil litigation, a corporation’s place of incorporation
and a corporation’s principal place of business are the “paradigm”
places where a corporation can be “fairly regarded” as at home; they
are “unique ... as well as easily ascertainable[,] ... afford[ing] plaintiffs
recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate
defendant may be sued on any and all claims.”)147
But in the case of a foreign corporation, what would suffice to
establish presence in the United States for this purpose? The sparse
legislative history provides a clue. In hearings on the 2008
amendments, Senator Durbin raised the issue of extraterritorial
TVPA jurisdiction, suggesting that U.S. law should provide for
jurisdiction over an individual trafficker who later retired to the
United States (and presumably was “present” here).148 Assuming,
arguendo, that such fleeting physical presence justifies extraterritorial
TVPA jurisdiction over individuals who are citizens of other nations,
should the same be true of corporations who do business in the United
States, even if those transactions are unrelated to the alleged TVPA
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2332i(b)(2)(a) (2015) (nuclear terrorism that takes place
outside the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 2280a(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2015)
(violence against maritime navigation and maritime transport involving
weapons of mass destruction that takes place outside the United States).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 2509(i).
146. 19 U.S.C. § 2601(11)(A), (B).
147. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 751, 760 (2014).
148. See Legal Options to Stop Human Trafficking: Hearing on H.R. 7311
Before the Senate Subcomm. On Human Rights and the Law of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Sen.
Richard J. Durbin).
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violations? If so, this would make extraterritorial jurisdiction under
the TVPA roughly parallel to general civil jurisdiction, rather than
specific jurisdiction. In the civil context, however, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Due Process clause to significantly restrict general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business in the United
States.149 The Court rejected the argument that general jurisdiction
obtains in any state in which a corporation “engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business.”150 A U.S. court may
only assert general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations where
“their affiliations with the [forum] State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home” in that state.151
The Court also cited the need to avoid international discord.152
Although this was a civil case, the courts might deem some of the
same constitutional and policy considerations relevant to construing
the scope of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under the TVPA.
2.

Civil liability

On its face, the provision granting extraterritorial jurisdiction
simply grants jurisdiction over the “offenses,”153 making no reference
to civil liability. However, the language conferring civil jurisdiction is
quite broad: it provides that a victim of an offense under Chapter 77
“may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have
known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an
appropriate district court of the United States and may recover
damages and reasonable attorneys fees.”154
Plaintiffs will likely argue that Congress intended the reach of the
civil and criminal remedies to coincide, but in recent decisions the
Supreme Court has emphasized that courts construing federal statutes
should apply a strong presumption against extraterritorial effect.155
These cases instructed the federal courts to apply a presumption
149. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (2014).
150. Id. at 760-61.
151. Id. at 751 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
152. Id. at 762 (discussing the lower court’s failure to consider international
comity).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2008).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015).
155. Many earlier cases had also recognized this presumption, but its
application had been uneven and courts more frequently found that
legislation applied extraterritorially. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 203 ch. 1 note 1 (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).
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against extraterritoriality: absent a clearly expressed Congressional
intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only
domestic application.156 In justifying this presumption, the Court
emphasized the need to avoid international discord157 or friction, as
well as the “common sense” view that Congress ordinarily focuses on
domestic matters.158 Although 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) does contain an
explicit grant of jurisdiction over criminal violations, the Supreme
Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Community159
suggests that the courts would nonetheless deem the presumption
against extraterritoriality applicable to the construction of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a), which provides for a civil remedy. In RJR the Court
confronted the question of whether RICO authorized jurisdiction over
civil claims for injuries suffered outside the United States.160 Despite
the fact that many predicate RICO offenses provide for
extraterritorial jurisdiction,161 the Court concluded that presumption
against extraterritoriality was applicable to the civil cause of action
for damages arising from RICO violations, which was accordingly
limited to domestic injuries.162 By the same logic, the grant of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the criminal offenses in 18 U.S.C. §
1596(a) has no effect on the reach of the civil action in § 1595(a),
which would be subject to the strong presumption against
extraterritorial effect.
It should be noted, however, that several courts have assumed
that there will be extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over TVPA
violations that occur after the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a). In
cases arising from conduct before the enactment in § 1596(a), these
courts have dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that §
156. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117-18 (2013)
(claims by Nigerian nationals for events that occurred in Nigeria were
barred because nothing in the Alien Tort Statute rebutted the
presumption against extraterritoriality); see also Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934 did not affirmatively rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality therefore did not apply extraterritorially).
157. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116-17 (“[T]he danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context
of the [Alien Tort Statute]”).
158. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (“[The presumption against
extraterritoriality] rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”).
159. RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
160. Id. at 2096.
161. See id. at 2101-2 (citing a number of RICO violations that explicitly
provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction).
162. Id. 2106.
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1596(a) does not apply retroactively.163 That point, of course, would
be moot if § 1596(a) had no effect in civil cases. Indeed, even a court
that recognized the applicability of RJR Nabisco’s analysis to civil
causes of action under § 1596 nonetheless suggested that the 2008
amendments might be given effect in civil cases.164
Assuming that the courts conclude that there is no extraterritorial
jurisdiction over actions under § 1595(a), that leaves open the
question whether some plaintiffs may be able to show that the “focus”
of the TVPA and violations that “touch and concern the territory of
the United States … with sufficient force”165 to warrant domestic
163. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190
(5th Cir. 2017); Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 324 (2d. Cir. 2012);
Plaintiff A v. Schair, No. 2:11-cv-00145-WCO, 2014 WL 12495639, at
*3-4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2014).
164. Adhikari V. KBR, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-2478, 2017 WL 4237923, at *13-14
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2017). The court stated:
RJR Nabisco’s general rule is clear: a civil remedy that lacks clear indications
of extraterritorial reach will redress only injuries experienced
domestically, no matter the substantive provisions’ scope. Section 1595
lacks those clear indications. Thus, on question of whether KBR’s
alleged domestic violations of Section 1590 caused remediable domestic
injuries or irremediable foreign injuries, the Court must conclude the
latter. Plaintiffs’ injuries, whatever their cause, were suffered only in
foreign countries. They are, therefore, beyond the reach of the TVPRA
that existed at that time.
The Court’s regret in reaching this holding is tempered by its recognition that
Congress later extended the remedies for forced labor and trafficking to
apply extraterritorially. That amendment of the law might be taken as
an indication of the scope that Congress always intended those
prohibitions to have. One can imagine canons of construction that
avoided the need for Congress so to act, resolving statutory ambiguity
in ways that further Congress’s purposes and erring on the side of
justice. But, as the Supreme Court’s recent rulings instruct, those are
not our canons. And so Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims must be dismissed.
165. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013); see
Skinner, supra note 18, at 656 (suggesting that courts may find no
extraterritorial civil jurisdiction under the TVPA because of its
decisions restricting general personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations). For TVPA cases applying these tests, see Samuel v.
Signal Int’l LLC, No. 1:13 CV-323, 2015 WL 112765986, at *3-4 (E.D.
Tex, Jan. 26, 2015) (focus of TVPA on where forced labor occurred;
transporting and recruiting workers into the United States is a domestic
not extraterritorial application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 & 1590); Tanedo v.
East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, No. SA CV10-01172 JAK
(MLGx), 2012 WL 5378742, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012)
(concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 1590 was not being applied
extraterritorially when defendants trafficked plaintiffs into the United
States to work here, though some initial contacts occurred in the
Philippines), See also Adhikari V. KBR, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-2478, 2017
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jurisdiction. As noted above,166 a producer who gains sales and
market share in the United States may be “benefitting financially” in
the United States as a result of forced labor overseas.

IV. Conclusion
It is too soon to say whether the TVPA can play an important
role in holding corporations accountable for human rights violation in
their supply chains. Virtually every key term remains to be defined,
and the scope of the jurisdictional provisions is equally uncertain. It is
worth noting that in construing the TVPA the federal courts are
likely to be affected by the same concerns that motivated them to
limit the ATS’s reach, namely that their capacity to adjudicate cases
arising from conduct occurring abroad.167 On the other hand, the
enactment and subsequent amendments broadening the TVPA show
that Congress has been concerned with activities occurring abroad.
The strongest case for extraterritorial civil litigation would likely
involve child sex trafficking, rather than labor trafficking, with
individual claimants seeking to recover damages from individuals and
corporate entities that knowingly benefitted from the sex trafficking.
Such a case would bring into play not only judicial and public concern
condemnation of such abuse of children, but also highlight Congress’s
strong concern with protecting and compensating victims of this
abuse.
Why has so little precedent construed the TVAP, since nearly 10
years has passed since the adoption of the civil cause of action and
the authorization of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction? A guide for
federal judges describes some of the challenges both courts and
atttorneys face in extraterritorial cases alleging human rights
violations:
Human rights cases often involve the broader challenges
inherent in any type of transnational litigation, in which
documents, physical evidence, and witnesses often are located
outside of the jurisdictional reach of the court. The parties’ need
to access evidence abroad may require that the court draw upon
various mechanisms for taking testimony and procuring
WL 4237923, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2017) (concluding that although
18 U.S.C. 1589’s prohibition on forced labor focuses on the place where
the forced labor occurred, 18 U.S.C. § 1590’s broader focus could
encompass conduct of actors in United States who instigated a
transnational human trafficking scheme but never brought workers to
the United States).
166. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing alternative
construction).
167. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing judicial concerns).
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documents overseas. Evidence obtained may be in one or more
foreign languages, necessitating the use of translation services in
pretrial and trial proceedings. There also are the challenges
inherent in adjudicating any piece of complex litigation, such as
large numbers of parties, large-scale discovery, class action
certification, and heightened media interest in the case.168

This account dovetails with concerns about the courts’ capacity to
adjudicate cases arising from activities occurring abroad, and it
highlights the enormous difficulties advocates face in attempting to
pursue civil cases for victims. The government would also face
enormous hurdles in pursuing such cases. In contrast, it can far more
easily prosecute TVPA cases involving foreign domestic servants
treated as virtual slaves in the United States,169 or women trafficked
and sexually abused or forced to work as prostitutes in the United
States.170
The TVPA stands in marked contrast with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, where enforcement has ramped up dramatically since
1997.171 At least when domestic and international relations
considerations are favorable, U.S. prosecutors can navigate the
problems of transnational litigation.172 When will the time be right for
aggressive enforcement of the TVPA provisions on forced labor and
benefitting from forced labor overseas?

168. Nersessian, supra note 16, at 2.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhanani, 599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010
(affirming conviction for forced labor, harboring aliens, peonage, and
domestic servitude for gross mistreatment of domestic servants); United
States v. Calilmlim, 538 F.3d 706 (affirming forced labor conviction for
gross mistreatment of housekeeper). For a case in which the court
found that the government had taken 18 U.S.C. § 1589 too far, see.
United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing forced
labor conviction based on requiring child relatives living with defendant
to perform household chores and imposing harsh discipline).
170. See., e.g., United States v. Rivera, 2013 WL 2339381 at *16 (E.D.N.Y.
June 19, 2012) (denying Rule 29 motion to set aside jury verdict finding
defendant guilty of forced labor of victims forced to work at bars where
they were sexually abused).
171. Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and
Domestic Strategy, 103 U. VA. L. REV. 1611, 1647-56 (2017).
172. See id. at 1655-78 (Brewster argues persuasively that the increased
FCPA enforcement occurred only after the United States successfully
concluded an international treaty that established anti-bribery as a
binding legal principle, legitimized U.S. prosecutions of foreign
corporations, and leveled the playing field for U.S. corporations).
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